Applied general equilibrium models with imperfect competition and econom ies of scale have been extensively used for analyzing international trade and development polic y issues. They offer a natural framework for testing the empirical relevance of propositions fr om the industrial organization and new trade theoretical literature. This paper warns mod el builders and users that considerable caution is needed in interpreting the results and deriving strong policy conclusions from these models: in this generation of applied general equilibrium mod els, nonuniqueness of equilibria is not a theoretical curiosum, but a potentially serious prob lem. Disregarding this may lead to dramatically wrong policy appraisals.
Introduction *
In his path-breaking contribution to the applied general equilibrium lit erature, Harris (1984) questioned the relevance for policy analysis of models built on the comp etitive Arrow-Debreu framework. In particular, he suggested that the disappointingly modest evaluations of trade liberalization effects produced by these models are artifacts of the com bined assumptions of pricetaking behavior and constant returns to scale in production, features th at real economies rarely possess. Building on elements of the new trade theory, he successfully showed this by introducing strategic price-setting behavior and increasing returns to s cale at the individual firm level in an otherwise standard applied general equilibrium (GE) model of the Canadian economy.
Static applied imperfectly competitive GE models incorporating scale eco nomies have since then been extensively used for analyzing trade liberalization issues, in part icular, the Canada-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA ) (e.g., Cox and Harris (1985) , Wigle (1988) , Brown and Stern (1989) , Markusen and Wigle (1989) , Hunter et al. (1991) ) and the European Single Market program (e.g., Gasiorek e t al. (1991) , Mercenier and Schmitt (1992) , Mercenier (1994) ), U.S. foreign trade policy issues (e.g., de Melo and Tarr (1992) ), and developing countries issues (e.g., Devarajan and Rodrik (1991) , de Melo and Roland-Holst (1994) ). The role of these models in the recent NAFTA d ebates demonstrates their potential importance for policy analysis.
For this reason, it is important to call the attention of model builders and users to the fact that considerable caution is needed in interpreting the results and part icularly in deriving policy conclusions from models of this vintage: in this area of economics, appl ied research tends to run ahead of theory because many conceptual issues remain open.
One such problem arises from the possibility that equilibria may not be unique. The whole benchmarking-calibration exercise is on a different logical level in a w orld with multiple equilibria, and it is not clear what the comparative statics policy exer cises really mean in such circumstances. One should presumably then resort to considerations of h istorical conditions and dynamic stability to pick the "relevant" equilibrium among the set of po ssible solutions.
Obviously, nonuniqueness in static applied GE is a potential serious pro blem, since modelers can have little confidence in any policy appraisal from their analysis. Yet , nonconvexities in * I am particularly indebted to Tim Kehoe both for his comments and for pi npointing a flaw in a previous version of the paper. I also thank for comments, discussions and/or enc ouragements Irma Adelman, Len Dudley, Robert Gary-Bobo, Rick Harris, Ed Prescott, Jacques Robert, Herb Scarf, T.N. Srinivasan, and an anonymous referee. Needless to say, I remain alone responsible for any error or shortcoming. Financial support from the FCAR of the Government of Québec and from the SSHRC of the Government of Canada and hospitality from the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis are gratefu lly acknowledged. production technologies generically imply that the equilibrium will not be unique, as has been known for a long time in the theoretical literature. Despite this, it i s remarkable that no case of multiple equilibria has been reported to be encountered in calibrated ap plied GE models with imperfect competition and economies of scale. Furthermore, an inspectio n of the literature reveals that applied GE modelers dealing with this vintage of models rarely--if ever--mention the problem. It is as if they feel that the conclusion, inherited from 20 ye ars of practice with competitive GE models, that "nonuniqueness is largely a theoretical curi osum", could safely be extended to models with imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale. It is my objective in this paper to show that this is not the case. 1 To do this, I use a calibrated, static large-scale applied GE model of t rade and production with increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition and product diff erentiation at the individual firm level. The model is a slightly modified version of the one I used in a previous paper (Mercenier (1994) ), and the parameter values are the same (and have therefore not been chosen for the specific needs of this paper). As will be clear from the descr iption in the next section, there is nothing pathological about this model even though it is somewha t more complex than most applied GE models of this vintage in the literature. The trade exp eriment that will be performed mimics the "Europe 1992" integration program. It consists of forcing a move from an initial equilibrium with segmented price-discriminated national markets to an equilibrium with firms selling at a unique price within the European Economic Community ( EEC). Though this experiment, detailed in Section 3, differs from the more usual tariff or tax exercises, it is clearly in the spirit of the new trade theory; see, e.g., Markusen and Venables (1 988). In Section 4, I report on two different stable equilibrium allocations that have been nu merically identified as the result of the same policy experiment. The paper closes with a brief con clusion.
1
Nonuniqueness of equilibria in competitive economies has been a lurking issue ever since work on applied GE modeling began in the early 1970s following Scarf (1973) . Kehoe (1 980, 1985a) , in particular, provides index theorems along with explicit formulae for calculations of the inde x of an equilibrium in the presence of production and taxes. However, when translated into economically inte rpretable restrictions on the parameters of a model, the conditions lose their necessity, so that, to date, whether or not nonuniqueness of equilibria in numerical models of competitive economies is more than a t heoretically possible occurrence remains an open question. See Kehoe (1991) for a recent synthesis. It turns out, however, that except for a numerical example of a fictitious though reasonably nonpathological econ omy produced by Kehoe (1985b) , and despite the very large number of applications, no example of multipl e equilibria has been reported in the literature. Furthermore, Kehoe and Whalley (1985) report on a systemat ic exploration of well-known, largescale, static competitive models and conclude to unicity, so that most a pplied GE modelers regard this potential nonuniqueness problem largely as a theoretical curiosum. This conclusion, although expedient, is to a certain extent further confirmed by the numerical investigation of Kehoe (1985c) . Shoven and Whalley (1984, p. 1015) conclude their discussion on the nonuniqueness issue a s follows: "The current working hypothesis adopted by most modelers seems to be that uniqueness can be p resumed for all of the models discussed here until a clear case of nonuniqueness is found." It should be emphasized that the contribution of this paper is to presen t a numerical example of multiplicity in a model with imperfect competition and economies of s cale calibrated on real world data. That multiple equilibria may exist in this type of model ha s been demonstrated theoretically (e.g., by Venables (1984) and Kemp and Schweinberger ( 1991) ). 2 Venables (1984) in particular develops a model which has the same basic ingredients as m ine. He shows that small perturbations in the parameters of his model may radically change the nu mber and the type of equilibria. He also shows, among other things, that if there are multip le equilibria, there are multiple stable equilibria. My paper demonstrates that the theoretical insight provided by Venables is of practical importance.
The Model

2.a An overview
The world economy consists of six countries/regions: Great Britain (GB), the Federal Republic of Germany (G), France (Fr), Italy (It), the rest of the EEC (RE) and the rest of the OECD (ROW). 3 All countries are fully endogenous and have the same structure. Each country has nine sectors of production, of which four are perfectly competitive; see Table 1 . In the latter sectors, countries are linked by an Armington system. 4 The other five industries are noncompetitive, with firms assumed symmetric within national boundaries. They operate with fixed primary factor costs and therefore face increasing returns to scal e in production. They have no monopsony power on any market for inputs, primary or intermediate.
Each individual oligopolist produces a different good. The game between noncompetitive
firms is Nash in sales. Industry structure is endogenous à la Chambe rlain: costless entry and exit ensure zero oligopolistic profits. The instantaneous GE concept adopted is a compromise in terms of informational requirements between the primitive conjectural-Co urnot-Nash-Walras equilibrium of Negishi (1961) and the objective-Cournot-Nash-Walras eq uilibrium introduced by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) . 5 Namely, noncompetitive firms are endowed with the knowledge of preferences and technologies of their clients, which they use in maxi mizing profits. They are, however, assumed to neglect the feedback effect of their decisions on th eir profits via income (the 2 I thank a referee for bringing those papers to my attention. The model is calibrated on a 1982 data base, and region RE actually represents the rest of the EEC-10 partners, and not the 12 present members of the EEC. For details on the data base, calibration procedure and parameter values, see Mercenier (1994) . 4 The Armington assumption has been a standard feature of competitive GE t rade models; see Shoven and Whalley (1984) , Srinivasan and Whalley (1986) . Although it is incre asingly criticized--see Norman (1990)--it has been adopted here in order to keep the treatment of the competiti ve side of the model as standard as possible.
Ford effect) and input-output multipliers (the Nikaido (1975) effect ). 6 Because of the presence of various forms of nontariff barriers (NTBs) within Europe, national eco nomies are initially assumed segmented, with noncompetitive firms acting as price-discriminat ing oligopolists; see, e.g., Brander (1981) .
Final demand decisions are made in each country by a single representati ve utilitymaximizing agent. A detailed country-and sector-specific system of pri ce-responsive intermediate demands is specified. All components of demand--final as w ell as intermediate--recognize differences in products from individual oligopolistic firms, à la Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) and Ethier (1982) . Both preferences and technologies, therefore, have inc reasing returns to varieties, so that product diversity affects not only household utility but also pr oduction efficiency in all sectors, competitive and noncompetitive. Both production factors move f reely across sectors, with capital being internationally mobile and European labor and labor o wners being mobile within the EEC. The model is static: our focus is on induced reallocati ons of existing resources, and we do not deal with factor accumulation.
2.b A formal presentation
Sectors of activity are identified by indices s,t∈S with S = C∪C where C and C denote, respectively, the subset of competitive and noncompetitive industries. Countries are identified by indices i,j∈W with W = EEC∪ROW, where the first subset represents the European Economic Community and the second the rest of the world. We keep track of the tr ade flows by identifying the first two indices with, respectively, the country and the industry s upplying the good and, when appropriate, the next two with the purchasing country and industry. 7 Households Domestic final demand decisions in country i are made by a single representative household.
It values competitively produced goods from different countries as imper fect substitutes (the Armington assumption) while it treats goods produced in oligopolistic s ectors as firm-specific. 6 This partial equilibrium compromise obviously simplifies the computation s. It has also been advocated in the theoretical literature (Hart 1985, p.121) to avoid nonexistence pr oblems highlighted by Roberts and Sonnenschein (1977) and Dierker and Grodal (1986) . The implication of such an assumption, however, is that firms are modeled as making their strategic decisions with systemat ic errors. This is certainly something that a GE modeler should want to avoid. The question is, of c ourse, whether in GE models calibrated on real world data, nonexistence is indeed a serious problem. As a corollary question, are the systematic errors that have been arbitrarily built into the oligopolists ' behavior of enough significance to affect the model's prediction when a policy experiment is performed? Th ese are important empirical issues that, to the best of my knowledge, have never been addressed. This is represented by a two-level utility function. The first level co mbines consumption goods (c .si ) assuming constant expenditure shares (ρsi). The second level determines the optimal composition of the consumption aggregates in terms of geographical origi n if the sector is competitive or in terms of the individual firms' products if the sector is noncompetitive. If we assume that the n js oligopolistic firms operating in country j's industry s share the same technology and have equal market shares (the symmetry assumption), 8 the household's preferences are represented as follows: The household supplies labor and capital services from which it earns it s income
Observe from the notation that both primary factors move costlessly across sectors; furthermore, capital is internationally mobile whereas l abor and labor owners are assumed to move freely within the EEC. Final demands c jsi of country i result from maximization of (1) subject to the following budget constraint:
where p denotes prices.
Firms
Competitive industries. In competitive industries, the representative firm of country i- Noncompetitive industries. Noncompetitive firms have increasing returns to scale in production: in addition to variable costs associated with technological constraints similar to (3), they face fixed primary factor costs. This introduces a wedge between a verage (V is ) and marginal (v is ) costs:
where Q is , L is F , K is F denote, respectively, the individual firm's output, fixed labor and fixed capital.
With initial market segmentation, the noncompetitive firm exploits the m onopoly power it has on each individual country market. To establish this, the firm is e ndowed with the knowledge of preferences (1) and technologies (3) of its clients. It then per forms a partial equilibrium profit 9
Observe that although goods enter preferences (1) and technologies (3 ) with the same degree of differentiation (the σs are assumed identical by lack of evidence otherwise), price responsiv eness will not be the same because the share parameters are different: the βs are sector-specific. We make the Cournot assumption of noncooperative behavior with sales to each individual market as the strategic variables z isj. Profit maximization then yields that
The computation of the elasticities on the right side of (7) requires inverting log-linearized aggregate demand systems. This is a very complex calculation; see the A ppendix for details.
Costless entry/exit ensures that oligopolists make zero profits:
General equilibrium
A general equilibrium is an allocation, supported by a vector of prices (pisj, w i , r), s∈S, i,j ∈W, such that − Households maximize (1) subject to (2); − Firms minimize (4) subject to (3); − Oligopolistic firms set prices according to (7) and satisfy the resu lting demand so that
and (8) holds;
− Industry concentration--as summarized by the real variable n is --is such that noncompetitive firms earn no pure profits; i.e., conditions (5) and ( 9) are satisfied. 10 For the pricing equation (7) to make sense requires that the equilibri um number of firms n is be greater than one:
(11) n is ≥ 1, s∈C;
− Supply equals demand in each competitive market:
where p c refers to the consumption price index and L sup to exogenously given labor stocks.
The ROW wage rate is chosen as the numéraire. 11 Calibration of the model to a base-year data set is made difficult because of equation (7). It requires the j oint determination of the 10 The treatment of n is as a real rather than an integer variable is widespread both in the theo retical trade literature and in the applied GE literature (for the latter, Mercenier and Schmitt (1992) is a notable exception). The reason for this is that it drastically simplifies both the analytics and the computations.
(One would otherwise have to resort to mixed-integer programming techni ques which are presently unable to handle large-scale nonlinear problems.) Though quite innocuous for man y sectors where n is is large, such an assumption may be thought to make little sense for highly concentrated i ndustries. One has to consider, however, that the hypothesis is made jointly with that of symmetry, so t hat, in any case, firms are abstract objects. One should therefore regard n is as an index of product variety rather than, strictly speaking, as a number of real world firms. 11 It is well known that price normalization matters in the objective-Courn ot-Nash-Walras GE model; see Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) . This raises important questions concernin g the theoretical consistency of the Cournot-Walras construction. Ginsburgh (1994) has recently called att ention to the issue by producing a numerical example in which manipulating the numéraire may be more wel fare-improving than removing market imperfections such as consumer taxes. If we disregard theoretica l consistency issues, a practical way out of this numéraire problem is to choose a normalization rule that involves only competitive prices. In addition, we consider only zero-profit equilibria which are, as shown by Kletzer and Srinivasan (1994) , immune to changes in the normalization rule.
markups and scale elasticities consistent with observed base-year expend itures and optimal price discrimination; see Mercenier (1994) for details.
The Trade Experiment: Completing the European Single Market
Following Smith and Venables ' (1988) formalization of the completion o f a single market in Europe, the numerical experiment consists of forcing individual firms to switch from their initial segmented-market pricing strategy to an integrated-market pricing strate gy determined from their average EEC-wide monopoly power. 12
The rationale underlying this experiment is the following. Although tar iffs within Europe are negligible, significant NTBs subsist, taking various more-or-less pe rnicious forms such as norms, government procurement policies and security regulations. 13 These barriers confer to firms the power to price-discriminate among national markets. The objec tive of the "Europe 1992" program is to restore cross-border arbitraging by suppressing all forms of NTBs. Firms would then be forced to charge a unique price within the EEC. Quantifyi ng these effects is difficult because NTBs are essentially unobservable. 14 The modeling strategy adopted treats these NTBs as latent variables underlying market segmentation within the community in the pre-"1992" equilibrium. We infer from the data set the price system consist ent with optimal price discrimination by oligopolistic firms and interpret these as resulting f rom the implicit structure of NTBs. The policy experiment then consists of forcing individual firms t o adopt single-pricing within Europe, determined from their average EEC-wide monopoly power, an d interpreting this behavioral change as the optimal strategic reaction to the elimination o f the implicit NTBs.
Formally, we rewrite the pricing equation (7) as
where p isEEC and z isEEC denote, respectively, prices and sales to a single Europe-wide market.
The model is calibrated with λ =1; market integration is implemented by setting λ =0. See the Appendix for details on the numerical evaluation of ∂log p isEEC /∂log z isEEC .
Results
12 The "Europe 1992" integration program aims at the abolition of all barri ers to movements of goods and production factors within the EEC. It includes explicit efforts to ease labor mobility, a feature that we have taken into account by our modeling of the factor markets. 13 See, e.g., CEC (1988) for an extensive identification of these barrier s. 14 It is, of course, well known that there is no such thing as a tariff-equ ivalence to NTBs in a noncompetitive environment. Table 2 documents two equilibrium allocations predicted by the model for the same policy experiment. 15 These spectacular results speak clearly for themselves, and I make only a few comments.
(1) Both equilibria have been conclusively tested for local stability in the sense that when started from initial values generated by ±1% random perturbations of equilibrium allocations and prices, the (Newton-type) algorithm converges back to the same equilibrium.
(2) The two equilibria have been obtained by forcing the algorithm on differ ent search paths by randomly choosing the competitive market-equilibrium condition that is b eing dropped thanks to Walras' law. Needless to say, that the model satisfies Walras's law is verified by checking that at the solution allocations and prices, all markets clear and all agents ar e on their budget constraints.
(3) It should be emphasized that it would be heroic to infer that the model has only two equilibria from the fact that I have been unable to produce more than tw o. As is made clear above, one has to resort to ad hoc trial and error-type explorations, mo st trial shots ending with the algorithm blowing out of numerical control. It is likely that, were it possible to exert a fuller control on the algorithm so that one could monitor the numerical search more widely in the feasible space, additional equilibria would be found. More generally, I want to suggest that nonuniqueness may well be the general rule rather than the exception in this generation of GE models and that if cases of multiple equilibria have not been encountere d before, it has more to do with the limitations of our numerical abilities and techniques than with the properties of the models.
(4) An extensive investigation of the case with fixed industry structure (n amely, the number of firms is held fixed and oligopolistic profits are not necessarily zero a nymore) has failed to produce more than one equilibrium. 16 This suggests that the Chamberlinian assumption of costless entry/exit could be a potential source of multiplicity (which can hardly be surprising
given that preferences and production technologies exhibit increasing re turns to the number of 15 In a previous version of this paper, I reported four different solution allocations. Tim Kehoe brought to my attention that two of these were in fact infeasible, since some computed n is were smaller than unity. Condition (11) has been added to the model, and the results reported h ere do satisfy the constraint. All computations have been performed using GAMS/MINOS (Brooke et al. ( 1988) ), which is the most popular software among GE modelers. GAMS/MINOS uses a projected Lagrang ian algorithm; see Murtagh and Saunders (1982) . The database, the code and the detailed equilibrium values for allocatio ns, prices and parameters are available from the author upon request (before one year past the date of publicat ion of the paper) preferably by E-mail (mercenie@plgcn.umontreal.ca) Venables (1984) suggests, however, that the problem is pot entially serious even with fixed national factor endowments.
(5) The two identified equilibria cannot be Pareto-ranked.
Conclusion
The existence of multiple equilibria in models of international trade wi th imperfect competition is not novel. Yet, the problem seems to have been largely i gnored by applied GE modelers, or at least its importance has been underestimated. This pape r has shown that nonuniqueness is a potentially serious problem in models that are curren tly being used for policy analysis. My contribution has been to present a numerical example of mu ltiplicity in a rather standard (though admittedly more sophisticated than usual) large-scale applied GE model calibrated on real world data.
In the specific model presented here, the source of the nonuniqueness re sult seems to be in the assumption of costless entry and exit of firms. This is troubling g iven that this Chamberlinian mechanism plays an important role in many applied GE models of this vint age. It is in particular a cornerstone of the rationalization of production effects forcefully stre ssed by Harris (1984) .
What is the appropriate methodological response to this nonuniqueness pr oblem? There is no easy answer to this question because many conceptual issues remain un addressed. A fullfledged dynamic theory of oligopolistic markets would certainly help to solve the nonuniqueness problem. Since such a theory is not yet available despite recent progre ss (e.g., Maskin and Tirole (1987, 1988a,b) ), considerable caution should be used in deriving str ong policy conclusions from these models.
b) The integrated market case
The only difference between the segmented and integrated market cases is that in the latter one has to deal with the EEC-aggregate demand system rather than with de mands from individual countries. System (A4) remains essentially unchanged (mar ket j now representing the aggregate EEC market), but the price elasticities are now weighted averages of those of individual countries: 
